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Adil Najam and Mark Halle
Accountability — or lack thereof — is 
a fundamental challenge confronting 
improved global environmental 
governance (GEG). No amount of 
organizational tinkering will pay 
dividends unless a fundamental 
shift takes place towards improved 
policy performance. Success must be 
measured not simply by the vitality 
of the negotiation process but by 
the robustness of implementation. 
States as well as institutions must 
be judged not by their statements of 
good intentions but by measurable 
implementation of their commitments 
and achievement of goals. 
By some measures, the progress of 
the GEG system has been impressive 
and encouraging. Institutions with a 
mandate to address environmental 
issues are in place nationally and 
internationally, covering a wide 
range of environmental topics, 
as well as the environmental 
dimensions of social and 
economic policy. A rich 
tissue of multilateral 
environmental agreements 
has been negotiated and 
put into place – many have 
been operating for decades. 
The world’s nations have formally 
adopted principles, guidelines, action 
plans, resolutions and declarations 
covering the spectrum of environmental 
concerns and have solemnly committed 
to implement these. International 
initiatives by civil society and 
business have also mushroomed 
— both in number and in depth of 
involvement. And, cumulatively, an 
“IfthegreatachievementoftheRioconferencein1992was
thatittriggeredasurgeofglobalenvironmentalnegotiations
andenvironmentalinstruments,itwouldbeafittinggoalfor
Rio+20toputtogetherarobustsystemofaccountability
aroundthesenegotiationsandinstruments.”
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impressive amount of funding has 
been allocated to environmental 
priorities at both the domestic and 
international level.
The complex and multi-faceted GEG 
system has achieved a measure of 
success. In some areas — such as 
reducing ozone-depleting substances 
or controlling trade in hazardous 
substances — the issues are on the 
road to resolution. In others, not 
only has a consensus been achieved 
on the nature and dimensions of the 
problem, but an array of tools has 
been developed to address it. And 
while the GEG system is somewhat 
dispersed, efforts have recently been 
made to streamline it and to render it 
both more cost-effective and efficient 
— for example with the clustering of 
the chemicals-related conventions. 
The UNEP Governing Council 
recently approved the establishment 
of a Consultative Group on 
International Environmental 
Governance to accelerate the process 
of strengthening environmental 
governance at the global level.
There are, however, other ways 
to assess progress. The most 
important of these is to ask 
whether the GEG system is solving 
problems at an adequate pace 
and shifting development onto a 
sustainable footing. Seen through 
this lens, the news is not good. In 
any number of areas — climate, 
biodiversity, fisheries, forests, 
water, environmental security — the 
situation worldwide has steadily 
deteriorated during the last decades 
of organized international action 
on the environment, and in some of 
these areas we are on the brink of an 
irreversible collapse.
As we search for an understanding 
of why this is so, there has rightly 
been a focus on better managing 
our system of global environmental 
governance and particularly on 
institutional effectiveness and, 
possibly, realignment. This focus is 
not misplaced, but it is incomplete. 
There is much that can and should 
be improved in the patchwork of 
institutions that has mushroomed 
over the years, but we need to 
realize that better governance can 
never be achieved unless the scale 
of the solutions matches the scale 
of the problem. Three, maybe even 
two, decades ago it was a major 
achievement simply to recognize 
that we had a problem and to create 
institutions around it. Today, we 
need to move beyond “problem 
recognition” to actual action — 
towards “problem solving.” It is 
time to take a sober look at why, 
despite the solemn commitments 
made by governments, meaningful 
action seldom follows. It is time 
to engage an honest discussion on 
the real reasons why political and 
policy obstacles thwart even the 
best intentions. But it is also time to 
look carefully at what compliance or 
enforcement mechanisms work and 
might be replicated and scaled up.  
Reformulating the culture of the GEG 
system and placing accountability 
at the center of governance debates 
will not be easy. But it is absolutely 
necessary, and entirely possible. Let 
us make the case why and outline at 
least a few immediate steps that can 
begin recalibrating the GEG system 
towards a culture of accountability. 
geg’s Culture of 
unaccountability
Let us begin by acknowledging that 
the challenge of unaccountability — 
and selective or partial accountability 
— is widespread in the international 
system. But it is not inevitable. 
The bad news is that in many 
arenas, such as human rights, these 
problems are even deeper than in 
the environmental arena. The good 
news is that in a few — for example, 
international trade — there is a 
relatively more evolved culture of 
international accountability. Global 
environmental governance should, 
therefore, aspire to do better than 
“Thereismuchthatcanandshouldbeimprovedinthepatchwork
ofinstitutionsthathasmushroomedovertheyears,butweneed
torealizethatbettergovernancecanneverbeachievedunlessthe
scaleofthesolutionsmatchesthescaleoftheproblem.”
“Attemptsatrules-basedgovernancehavebeenmade—e.g.ozone
protectionandendangeredspeciesmanagement—butthedominant
cultureisoneofmoralpersuasion,andrules-basedgovernanceends
upbeinganunsavorylastalternative.”
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it has and there is reason to believe 
that it can, in fact, do better in terms 
of accountability. 
The accountability challenge in 
global environmental governance is 
acute at three levels and we need to 
respond at each of these levels. (See 
box.) As we think about doing so, let 
us try to understand why the culture 
of unaccountability has become 
such a pervasive feature of the GEG 
system. At least five reasons can be 
readily identified:
First, GEG has tended to be 
“declaratory” rather than 
“regulatory”. Unlike other areas 
of international governance that 
pride themselves on being “rules-
based”, global environmental 
governance has tended to flow 
from values-based, and sometimes 
knowledge-based, persuasion. From 
the 1972 Stockholm Conference 
onwards — including in the recently 
concluded Copenhagen negotiations 
on climate change — every major 
GEG effort has begun, and often 
ended, with the proposition that if 
only countries could understand the 
gravity of the problems confronting 
the planet they would themselves 
do the “right thing”; that which 
is good not only for them but for 
everyone. This, of course, leads to 
the classic free-rider problem where 
everyone wants everyone else to do 
the “right thing” while they benefit 
from being the exception. Attempts 
at rules-based governance have been 
made — e.g. ozone protection and 
endangered species management 
— but the dominant culture is one 
of moral persuasion, and rules-
based governance ends up being an 
unsavory last alternative. It is not a 
surprise, then, that the rule-making 
itself is often half-baked and that 
there is little or no focus — and even 
When examining international organizations, there seem to be at least 
three different accountabilities that need to be addressed separately, 
even though they are closely connected to one another. 
Accountability to mandate.  Is the international organization accomplishing 
what it is supposed to accomplish?  Businesses, for example, are most clear 
on this type of accountability and measure it by their bottom lines. 
International organizations are surprisingly silent on this. For example, 
if you ask a treaty secretariat what they achieved they are more likely 
to tell you how many meetings were held and how many decisions were 
made, rather than to say whether, how and to what extent the purpose 
of the treaty (say, conserving biodiversity) was advanced because 
of these meetings and decisions. At the end of the day, should we 
hold the UNFCCC accountable by how many heads of states showed 
up at Copenhagen or by whether real steps were taken to stabilize 
atmospheric greenhouse gas concentrations to prevent dangerous 
interference with the climate system?
Institutional accountability.  Are international organizations being managed 
well?  By this we mean the most basic measures of management processes 
— hiring, retaining, staff performance and reward, budgetary controls, 
etc. These have occasionally become the subject of public discussion, 
but usually when they become “scandals” (e.g., oil for food). More 
important, these issues are often raised by those who wish to discredit 
the GEG system as a means to weaken global institutions, rather than by 
those who have a real interest in improving its performance. The result 
seems too much like a conspiracy of silence by the supporters of the GEG 
system who choose to wink, nod and ignore blatant managerial abuse in 
international organizations, just because they do not wish to strengthen 
the hands of those out to “cut the system down to size.”
Accountability to constituency.  Are international organizations accountable 
to those in whose names they speak and act?  This type of accountability 
begins to get straight to the power politics within the institution and 
how it affects their agenda and actions. At the broadest level, we 
confront this in the inter-state politics surrounding global institutions, 
but increasingly we are also seeing it play out in the politics of and 
between state and non-state actors. One would argue that Member 
States are not the constituency of international organizations, but the 
custodians of these organizations. The constituency — particularly in the 
case of environmental institutions — is the global citizenry. The global 
citizenry interacts with global institutions through the state apparatus, 
but in doing so it does not cede its right to hold the actions of these 
institutions accountable. 
three levels of accountability in international 
organization
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less time spent — on thinking about 
meaningful compliance mechanisms. 
Often, even when a rules-based 
system is set up — as, for example, it 
was in the Kyoto Protocol — there is 
little attention paid to mechanisms of 
accountability for those who do not 
live up to their commitments. 
Second, GEG has evolved into 
a negotiation system rather 
than an implementation system. 
Environment has been one of the 
most active areas of international 
negotiation for the last 20 
years. The growth in the number 
and intensity of international 
environmental negotiations has 
been mind-boggling, especially for 
the negotiators involved. This was 
to be expected because the issue 
was a relatively new one, with layers 
of complexity and interconnections 
and with new issues popping up 
on the international scene even as 
older issues were still simmering in 
negotiation. The result has been 
an over-heated negotiation system, 
but also a system that tends to see 
negotiation as its primary function 
and goal. Environmental negotiations 
have become unending and the 
participants proficient at inventing 
new reasons to keep negotiating. 
Environmental institutions, and 
especially the secretariats of the 
various environmental treaties, 
have morphed into — and see 
themselves as — negotiation support 
services. World leaders, the media 
and the larger environmental 
community measure GEG efforts 
by the treaties that are produced 
rather than by actual improvements 
in global environmental metrics. 
More important, it is a system 
populated by negotiators and not 
by implementers. A permanent 
class of international environmental 
negotiators hop from one treaty 
negotiation to the next, adept at 
the intricacies of international 
negotiations but distant from the 
practicalities of implementation. 
Those who do face the challenges 
of everyday implementation have 
little input in the design and 
even less in the ownership of the 
treaties that they inherit from the 
negotiators. Whatever motivation 
they might otherwise have had in 
implementation is further sapped 
because there are no incentives from 
the international community for 
good implementation; worse still, 
there are few effective disincentives 
for failure to implement. This 
challenge is particularly acute 
for developing countries where 
precious few resources are siphoned 
off to servicing the appetites of 
international negotiation, even 
as so many of their most pressing 
challenges pertain to domestic 
implementation.
Third, many of the actors who 
actually shape environmental 
governance are not represented in 
international decision-making. It is 
widely acknowledged — especially 
in the domain of environmental 
governance — that our global 
realities are being shaped by 
forces beyond the nation-state. 
Global governance processes have 
themselves acknowledged this reality 
but have yet to find meaningful 
avenues of participation for non-
state actors — whether civil society 
groups, business interests, or local 
communities — beyond allowing 
multiple stakeholders token presence 
at international meetings. Well-
meaning as such participation might 
be, and not withstanding some 
notable examples, most non-state 
actors have no real tools to hold the 
international system accountable for 
its actions (or inaction); nor does the 
international system have any real 
tools with which to engage with civil 
society. And yet the actions of each 
can have tremendous impact on the 
others. For example, decisions made 
by large global corporations can 
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“...itisasystempopulatedbynegotiatorsandnotbyimplementers.
Apermanentclassofinternationalenvironmentalnegotiatorshop
fromonetreatynegotiationtothenext,adeptattheintricacies
ofinternationalnegotiationsbutdistantfromthepracticalitiesof
implementation.”
s u s ta i n a b l e  d e v e lo pm en t  i n s i g h t s     |     0 0 5     |     m a y  2 0 1 0           5
awareness of global environmental 
challenges was, justifiably, a major 
achievement. Similarly, in the 1990s, 
in the years leading to and from the 
Rio Earth Summit, merely creating 
new institutions and treaties was, 
justifiably, a major achievement. 
These developments need to be 
celebrated, but — partly because of 
this success — we now have a much 
more acute understanding of how 
much larger and more pressing these 
problems are than we had once 
assumed. However, the ambition of 
the GEG system has not kept pace 
with our own understanding of what 
needs to be done. Nowhere is this 
more evident than in climate change 
— where the goals that science 
demands of us are not even under 
consideration on the negotiation 
tables — but it is true much more 
widely across a whole range of 
issues. We are doomed, therefore, to 
constantly celebrate small successes 
— an agreement here, a statement 
there, a gesture somewhere else — 
even when the problem is not just 
big, but huge, and even when some 
of what we celebrate are not really 
successes at all. The thresholds of 
aspiration keep sliding downwards 
in behavior that is at least partly 
self-delusional: each negotiation is 
measured in terms of “small steps 
forward”, “foot in the door”, and 
“silver linings” even as the magnitude 
of the problem keeps increasing. The 
greatest tragedy may be that even 
the institutional capabilities that are 
available to the system are not being 
used because our measures of what 
counts as “progress” are so low.
Fifth, the GEG system has a 
structural impediment to global 
accountability in the lack of 
real disincentives for failing to 
implement. The much-abused 
principle of national sovereignty 
has somehow been interpreted in 
environmental politics to imply an 
abdication of global responsibility. 
In a world defined by declaratory 
decisions and strong sovereignty, 
implementation — even of 
sovereign commitments — seems 
to have become optional rather 
than obligatory. The structural 
impediment, of course, is that there 
sometimes have greater influence on 
global processes than those made by 
even some middle-sized nation states. 
There are great opportunities in the 
“non-traditional alliances” emerging 
amongst disparate actors in global 
public policy networks (GPPNs) 
— for example, WWF joining 
forces with interested state parties 
on World Trade Organization’s 
(WTO’s) fisheries subsidies, the 
campaign for a land mine treaty, the 
International Institute for Sustainable 
Development’s (IISD’s) work on 
forming a coalition of different 
actors on fossil fuel subsidies, 
etc. Yet, in the absence of proper 
institutional incentives, the potential 
of such partnerships — including on 
engendering better accountability 
— is largely being missed. One 
of the goals of more effective 
stakeholder participation is itself to 
engender better accountability. Yet, 
international environmental decision-
making still remains distant from 
those who are going to be affected 
by its decisions, which means that 
many of those who have the deepest 
interest in making the system more 
accountable remain unable to do so. 
Fourth, the scale of our GEG 
ambitions no longer matches the 
scale of the problems, or even our 
institutional capabilities. Back in 
the 1970s, in the years leading to 
and from the Stockholm conference, 
simply raising international 
“Whileaccountabilitywillnotbeachievedovernight,therearea
numberofstepsthatcanbetakennowthatareentirelyfeasible
andwillbegindevelopingacultureofaccountabilitywithinthe
GEGsystem.”
“Thethresholdsofaspirationkeepslidingdownwards
inbehaviorthatisatleastpartlyself-delusional:
eachnegotiationismeasuredintermsof‘smallsteps
forward’,‘footinthedoor’,and‘silverlinings’evenas
themagnitudeoftheproblemkeepsincreasing.”
is no disincentive — beyond shaming 
— for failing to implement. Shaming 
itself becomes less and less effective 
over time and with repeated failures 
to implement, and even more so as 
the proportion of those not meeting 
their own obligations increases. A 
particularly disturbing aspect of this 
problem is that the international 
system has little to no institutional 
memory of who has failed to 
implement what. 
Take, for example, the climate 
change negotiations. Each 
subsequent COP seems to create a 
new global fund or instrument of 
some sort with great fanfare, only to 
be followed by other COPs that fail 
to hold countries accountable on 
whether they fulfilled those earlier 
pledges. Since little information is 
kept or collected of who is failing to 
do what, the scope of shaming as 
an accountability device is further 
reduced. The structural lack of 
mechanisms to monitor the level 
of implementation of obligations 
also has a detrimental impact 
on negotiator behavior, since the 
norm is to seek big promises today 
without any reliable means to 
determine tomorrow whether they 
were kept.
a realistic agenda for 
better accountability
International accountability is 
a critical governance challenge. 
While accountability will not be 
achieved overnight, there are a 
number of steps that can be taken 
now that are entirely feasible and 
will begin developing a culture 
of accountability within the GEG 
system. We present seven related 
ideas for GEG reform, all of which 
have the potential to place the 
system on a trajectory for greatly 
enhanced performance. These are 
presented in the order of increasing 
ambition but we remain convinced 
that all of them are doable — and 
worth doing — today.
1.  Increase transparency, including 
national reporting requirements 
and mechanisms for secretariats 
to collect, collate and report on 
performance indicators (as opposed 
to effort indicators). An extensive 
system of national reporting on 
global environmental governance is 
already in place, especially through 
requirements for national reports 
to conferences of parties. Yet, these 
are reports about efforts made 
rather than about goals achieved. 
There is very little information in 
these reports on actual performance 
indicators. Instead, these reports 
tend to be indications of intention 
or listings of initiatives. We need to 
move towards mandated national 
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reporting requirements to gauge 
progress against obligations and 
commitments, using agreed upon 
sets of indicators. Treaty secretariats, 
through better-structured national 
reports, should be tasked with 
collating transparent, comparable, 
and quality information on 
performance indicators.
2.  Complete the compilation of 
a register of global goals and 
obligations that countries have, in 
fact, agreed to. There is a plethora 
of such goals and commitments. 
Many are already forgotten, and 
most remain unimplemented. 
Simply collating all these goals 
using a central and transparent 
mechanism will immediately 
have a salutary impact on global 
negotiations; negotiations will then 
(a) have a ready reference to what 
has already been agreed to and 
(b) have an incentive only to make 
those commitments that they have 
the intention and ability to fulfill. 
The goal in such a system would be 
for it to evolve, rather quickly, into 
a system of commitment tracking 
and reporting. Such a mechanism 
has also been proposed by IISD for 
tracking GEG financing and is already 
used by the OECD for tracking 
development financing. Doing so 
for commitment tracking has the 
potential not only to improve GEG 
accountability but also to allow 
individual countries to make better 
GEG commitments. 
“Justlikeasystemwherethereislittlerecognitionofunaccountability
leadstoacultureofunaccountability,institutingasystemof
recognizinggoodpracticeislikelytoencouragemoregoodpractice
andmovethesystemtowardsacultureofaccountability.”
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“Accountabilitycomesnotonlyfromtransparencyandpunitive
oversight,itcomesalso—andoftenmoreso—fromabalanced
systemofincentives.”
the lead in this, it will become more 
and more difficult for other actors 
not to follow suit. The desired 
outcome is for improved GEG 
accountability all around. 
5.  Establish a system of incentives 
for better performance and reward 
good behavior and early action. 
Accountability comes not only 
from transparency and punitive 
oversight, it comes also — and 
often more so — from a balanced 
system of incentives. The problem 
of accountability today is not only 
that the system does not punish bad 
behavior, but also that it does not 
reward good behavior. We should 
consider setting up a system that 
rewards countries that have the best 
record in compliance. This could be 
done, for example, by giving them 
trade preferences, or giving them 
preferential access to international 
credit or to global support funds 
such as the Global Environmental 
Facility (GEF). We already have 
many precedents for giving 
preferential treatment to countries 
on the basis of need; it is time to 
also give preferential treatment on 
the basis of performance.
6.  Institutionalize a system of 
periodic global performance 
monitoring and reporting by making 
accountability a key function of 
the GMEF and creating mechanisms 
for measurable indicators of 
performance. By making GEG 
accountability the central purpose 
of each GMEF, we would be creating 
an incentive for all actors in the 
GEG system to remain cognizant 
of this periodic accountability 
review. Just as the systems of annual 
performance review of employees 
provides workers with a permanent 
incentive to keep an eye on their 
own performance and also signals 
to them what “achievements” will 
be valued, imparting a regular 
accountability review function to 
the GMEF will send a signal to 
all actors in the system that (a) 
accountability is a key concern, (b) 
accountability has to be a regular 
and permanent preoccupation, 
and (c) accountability metrics 
are important and highly visible 
measures of success.
7.  Finally, it may be time to think 
of a global instrument to ensure 
better global environmental 
accountability. In essence this would 
resemble a global version of the 
Aarhus Convention on Access to 
Information, Public Participation 
in Decision-making and Access to 
Justice in Environmental Matters. 
All of the above recommendations 
would feed into this global 
instrument; indeed, the Aarhus 
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3.  Create a compendium of 
best practices in compliance 
and enforcement. Harsh as our 
assessment of the overall situation 
might be, it is also true that there 
are pockets of achievement, and 
sometimes even excellent examples. 
These examples need to be 
documented and celebrated, so that 
they can be replicated and scaled up. 
Such a compendium is an important 
step towards benchmarking not 
just best practice, but also levels 
of expectation. Just like a system 
where there is little recognition of 
unaccountability leads to a culture of 
unaccountability, instituting a system 
of recognizing good practice is likely 
to encourage more good practice 
and move the system towards a 
culture of accountability. An annual 
compendium of best practice — 
possibly launched each year at the 
Global Ministerial Environment 
Forum (GMEF) — would provide 
a positive incentive to the best 
performers and reinforce a sense that 
the system as a whole rewards not 
just accountability, but excellence in 
implementation.
4.  Require independent third-
party reviews and monitoring of 
performance, including bench-
marking of best-practice. This could 
be modeled on the OECD reviews 
of national environmental policy 
or on the model used by the civil 
society-led wildlife trade monitoring 
network, TRAFFIC. But the essential 
element of the proposal is that the 
monitoring of GEG performance 
becomes verifiable and independent 
through the involvement of third 
parties. Environmental leaders 
will need to set this program in 
motion by voluntarily initiating such 
performance reviews to establish 
themselves as the purveyors of best 
practice. Once enough of them take 
www.un.org/esa/dsd    http://tinyurl.com/susdevkp    www.bu.edu/pardee
Convention already has a working 
model that has been widely cited 
as a success. Moreover, as we begin 
preparations for a 2012 Rio+20 
conference, negotiation of such 
a global instrument might be a 
goal that Rio+20 sets for itself. 
If the great achievement of the 
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Rio conference in 1992 was that 
it triggered a surge of global 
environmental negotiations and 
environmental instruments, it 
would be a fitting goal for Rio+20 
to put together a robust system 
of accountability around these 
negotiations and instruments. •
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